Kip Hagopian

Why do we have a Corporate Income Tax?

By Kip Hagopian

Overview

The corporate income tax was first introduced in 1909 at a rate of one percent. At that time, the imposition of the tax was seen as a way to regulate the corporate form of business, rather than as a way to raise revenue—which may explain the inconsequential rate. Initially, the tax was called a corporate “excise tax”, because taxing income then was considered to be unconstitutional. The excise tax was publicly justified under on a theory that a corporation, as contrasted with a partnership or a proprietorship, was an “artificial entity” separate from and not directly managed by its shareholders, and thus could be taxed legally under the federal powers in place at the time. The principal rationale for the tax was that, since the government afforded corporations certain advantages relative to other forms of organization (primarily limited liability for shareholders) it was deemed appropriate that they pay for the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity.

The corporate excise tax was hotly contested at the time but was eventually passed into law. Since 1909, the one percent rate has been gradually, but quite substantially, increasing. After reaching a high of 52.8 percent in 1968-69, the rate has settled at 35 percent, where it has been since 1993. This is the “statutory” rate (before any tax preferences) and does not include state taxes, which range from zero to as high as 12 percent. Currently, the combined rate of federal and state taxes on corporate income stands at 39.1 percent, comprised of a federal statutory rate of 35 percent and an average state rate of 6.6 percent.

This high rate now seems nonsensical in light of the original rationale for the tax; particularly since corporate income is now double taxed via levies on dividends and capital gains received by individual shareholders. These individual taxes, including federal and state-to-doubted 30.3 percent (23.8 percent for federal and an average state rate of 6.5 percent net of the federal deduction), which raises the average, aggregate rate of tax on corporate income to 57.6 percent.

According to the Office of Management and Budget, federal corporate-level income tax revenue in 2013 was approximately $273 billion. This was 9.9 percent of aggregate federal revenues, which included (in addition to the corporate levy) taxes on: earned income, payroll (to fund Social Security and Medicare), capital gains, dividends, rents, interest, inheritance, and imports.

Although the corporate statutory tax rate is 39.1 percent, several deductions, subsidies, and credits, together with certain tax avoidance or deferral benefits flowing from the use of legally-sanctioned foreign tax structures in low-tax-rate countries, have reduced the average effective corporate tax rate to about 29 percent. Most of the corporations that avail themselves of these foreign tax structures are large multinationals. But many corporations—in industries such as retailing, financial services, construction, and defense—earn the vast majority of their income in the U.S. and thus, must pay close to the statutory federal and state rates. This includes hundreds of thousands of small businesses that are organized as “C corporations”, as distinguished from “flow through entities” like proprietorships, Sub-chapter S-corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies.

Make Believe

As a means of illustrating the perverse nature of the current corporate tax system, let’s imagine that, in a make-believe world dividends and capital gains continue to be taxed, but there is not, and never has been a tax levied on corporate profits at the corporate level. Now let’s imagine that the President of the United States has come up with a way to raise new tax revenue and has called into the oval office his top economic advisor, Dr. Milton Hayek, to discuss his idea. Here is the transcript of that meeting:

        The President: Milton, I have just come up with a clever way of raising a couple hundred billion in new tax revenue. What would you think if we enacted a new tax on the profits of all American corporations?

             Milton: (Long pause) Well, Mr. President, this is a bit of a surprise, since we already tax this same income by taxing dividends and capital gains.

             The President: I know that. This would be a second tax on those same profits. But this tax would be paid by the corporation itself. I intend to retain the full 23.8 percent tax on dividends and capital gains.

       Milton: Double tax? This is quite unusual. At what rate do you propose taxing income at the corporate level: One or two percent?

         The President: No way. I’m thinking 35 percent; that way we can raise some real money.

          Milton: But Mr. President, if we tax corporate income at 35 percent at the corporate level and then tax the 65 percent residual via the 23.8 percent tax on dividends and capital gains, by my calculations the total federal tax on corporate profits will be over 50 percent. This is significantly higher than even the 39.6 percent maximum rate we charge on workers’ salaries and wages, and on other incomes such as interest, and rents. And this doesn’t even include state taxes. That seems extraordinarily high to me.

      The President: Well, we need the money, Milton. We need the money! Besides, this tax will be on corporations, not people. And corporations don’t vote!

           Milton: With all due respect, Mr. President, I beg to differ—at least as to who will pay this tax. A corporation is only a legal artifact, so taxing is just an indirect way of taxing people. All economists agree on that. All people should agree on that; I mean where else can tax dollars come from?

       The President (embarrassed): Well, I didn’t know that. I guess I never thought about it. But even if that’s true, the tax would be paid by wealthy shareholders, wouldn’t it? Why should we worry about those people?

        Milton: Well sir, first of all, it isn’t just wealthy people who own stocks. Half of all middle-class Americans are invested in the stock market in one way or another. And much of the stock owned by these people is held in pension funds and other tax-deferred retirement accounts like IRAs and 401ks. These entities own over 35 percent of the total value of publicly traded corporate stock. And as you know, in order to allow for the maximum accumulation of retirement savings by American workers, we do not currently tax pension funds and other tax-deferred entities. If we impose this second tax on corporations, we would be indirectly taxing the beneficiaries of these entities in direct contradiction to our established policy. This is certainly not what these beneficiaries were promised. How can we justify taxing them in this way? And if we do tax them, how can we justify such a high rate? Wouldn’t this be clearly unfair?

         The President: Mumm. Milton, I am beginning to think you don’t like my idea.

           Milton: I’m sorry Mr. President, but I feel I should point out that this issue is a bit more complicated than you may think. On the surface, it might appear that shareholders will bear the entire burden of the tax through a reduction in their investment returns. But speaking as an economist, I don’t believe this will be true. Investors and their appointed managers are profit-maximizers. Thus, they will look at a tax at the corporate level as they would any other increase in the cost of doing business. Faced with a reduction in their after-tax returns below a level commensurate with their risk, they will attempt to offset the cost of the tax by cutting expenses elsewhere or by finding other ways of increasing pre-tax profits. For example, they might seek to offset the tax by cutting the salaries and wages of workers. We saw this happen in the aftermath of the recent recession, when some of the auto companies, in danger of going out of business, were able to renegotiate their union contracts, resulting in significantly lower wage expenses.

Shareholders may also pressure corporate managers to pass the tax on to consumers in the form of price increases. Of course, the ability to do that would depend on the circumstances of each company. For example, if the company competes in the global marketplace, raising prices will be quite difficult.

Ultimately, I am confident that, on average, a significant part of this new tax will be borne by workers, albeit it will be indirect and worse yet, invisible to the taxed parties. As to shareholders, I believe a reasonable estimate of their share of the tax would be over 50 percent. Whatever it turns out to be, it is quite likely that, faced with a higher cost of capital, and thus a lower return on investment, they will bid down the price of stocks until the new prices produce adequate market returns. Alternatively, they will choose to move their capital out of U.S. corporations and into bonds, real estate, and non-corporate enterprises in the U.S., or into foreign-domiciled companies where tax rates are lower. In any event, stock prices will decline—perhaps precipitously. Essentially, what I am saying is this tax will reduce our economic efficiency, the consequences of which—

            The President (interrupting): Wait a minute—what do you mean by “economic efficiency”?

           Milton: I’m sorry, let me explain. When we economists use the term economic efficiency, we are talking about the extent to which the economy maximizes the production and distribution of goods in relation to the consumption of resources. In order for the economy to achieve maximum efficiency, economists believe economic policies should be neutral, meaning they must not cause changes in individual behavior that would distort the allocation of resources. This usually means eschewing policies that would interfere with the free market, such as taxes and subsidies.

For example: as I pointed out, a new tax at the corporate level will reduce after-tax profits. This will increase the cost of capital to all American corporations making them less competitive in the global marketplace. This will result in lower growth in GDP, job creation, and median income. This is what I mean by reducing economic efficiency.

             The President: Alright, alright. Go on.

         Milton: Forgive me sir, but I just don’t think this is a good idea. Here’s why: You propose to impose a major new tax, ostensibly on “corporations”, but in reality, on shareholders, workers, and possibly consumers, in as yet unknown proportions. What we know is, to the extent the tax is borne by shareholders, it will discourage investment in American corporations and, as a result, will likely reduce America’s competitiveness. Alternatively, to the extent this tax falls on workers, the tax rate will, in the main, be “flat”, that is, proportionate to income. While this might be a better system of taxation, it is certainly at odds with our existing system, which is progressive. Lastly, if the tax falls on consumers in the form of price increases it will be regressive, which most people believe is inequitable.

Mr. President, if I may be so bold, allow me to offer these alternatives: If we believe investors in corporations are under taxed, why don’t we just tax them directly? Under this new tax we would be taxing them at a much higher rate than we tax other incomes like wages, savings accounts, bond interest, and rents. Is such a rate either fair or economically efficient? If we believe the American workers are not paying enough taxes, why not just raise their rates? If we believe a consumption tax is needed, why don’t we select the most fair and efficient of the various consumption tax proposals and implement it? Lastly, if we want to tax income attributed to pension funds and other tax-deferred entities, why not do so directly?

Well, those are all good questions, Milton. Spoken like the economist that you are and a damned good one too! Now let a politician explain the real world to you. I could never get any of those alternatives you propose through Congress. The beauty of my proposal is in how it will be perceived by the public and the press. The vast majority of people will not see this as a tax on individuals, but as a tax on businesses, which, as you know, do not fare well in public opinion polls. And those few that understand that only people pay taxes will assume it will be paid by rich investors, who—I shouldn’t have to remind you—also do not poll well with the public. To the extent this tax falls on workers and consumers, it will be completely hidden. For all these reasons, my proposal will sell, whereas yours will not. Get with the program Milt!

Now, it is important to note that, while this dialogue was contrived, the facts about the corporate income tax, and the characterization and analysis of it by the imaginary president and his top economic advisor are accurately presented.

Back to reality

Table 1 shows a comparison of U.S. corporate income tax rates with 33 other industrialized nations, all of which are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The table separates out the components of the corporate tax, which include the corporate-level tax—both federal and state (or in the case of non-U.S. nations, “sub-national” governments, such as provinces, counties, cantons, etc.) and individual income taxes, both federal and state, on dividends and capital gains.

Table 1 — Corporate Income Tax / Dividend Tax / Overall Rate

France — 36.4% / 44.0% / 64.4%

United States — 39.1% / 30.3% / 57.6%

Denmark — 25.0% / 42.0% / 56.5%

Ireland — 12.5% / 48.0% / 54.5%

Canada — 26.3% / 33.8% / 51.1%

Korea — 24.2% / 35.4% / 51.0%

Portugal — 31.5% / 28.0% / 50.7%

Belgium — 34.0% / 25.0% / 50.5%

Spain — 30.0% / 27.0% / 48.9%

Germany — 30.2% / 26.4% / 48.6%

Norway — 28.0% / 28.0% / 48.2%

Israel — 25.0% / 30.0% / 47.5%

Australia — 30.0% / 23.6% / 46.5%

United Kingdom — 23.0% / 30.6% / 46.5%

Sweden — 22.0% / 30.0% / 45.4%

Austria — 25.0% / 25.0% / 43.8%

Netherlands — 25.0% / 25.0% / 43.8%

Luxembourg — 29.2% / 20.0% / 43.4%

Japan — 37.0% / 10.0% / 43.3%

Italy — 27.5% / 20.0% / 42.0%

Finland — 24.5% / 22.4% / 41.4%

Chile — 20.0% / 25.0% / 40.0%

Slovenia — 17.0% / 25.0% / 37.8%

Switzerland — 21.1% / 20.0% / 36.9%

Iceland — 20.0% / 20.0% / 36.0%

Poland — 19.0% / 19.0% / 34.4%

Turkey — 20.0% / 17.5% / 34.0%

Greece — 26.0% / 10.0% / 33.4%

New Zealand — 28.0% / 6.9% / 33.0%

Hungary — 19.0% / 16.0% / 32.0%

Czech Republic — 19.0% / 15.0% / 31.2%

Mexico — 30.0% / 0.0% / 30.0%

Slovak Republic — 23.0% / 0.0% / 23.0%

Estonia — 21.0% / 0.0% / 21.0%

OECD Average excluding U.S. (GDP weighted) — 28.6% / 23.1% / 45.2%

As the table indicates, when federal and state taxes are combined, the U.S. corporate-level tax rate is 39.1 percent, the highest in the industrialized world and 37 percent higher than the 28.6 percent, GDP-weighted average rate for the other 33 OECD nations. These rates are the “statutory” rates, which don’t include the tax preferences, and tax avoidance and deferral benefits described earlier. When these subsidies are included for all countries in the sample, the average effective rate for OECD countries drops to 20.6 percent, while the U.S. effective rate declines to about 29 percent, which is 41 percent higher than the average of the OECD nations.

Note that the vast majority of nations double-tax corporate income—once at the corporate level where it is earned, and once again when the after-tax income is either distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends, or when a shareholder sells stock in a capital gains transaction.

It is well accepted that the taxation of dividends is a second tax on corporate income. What does not seem to be well understood is that the capital gains tax is also a second tax. The only difference is that, in the case of dividends, the extra tax is levied on corporate income that is distributed, while nominally, the capital-gains tax is a tax on corporate income that is retained. (In both cases corporate income has already been taxed at the corporate level.) Actually, it is a little more complicated than that. A share of stock has two components that contribute to its ultimate fair value. One is the tangible net worth of the corporation, which consists of paid-in capital and retained earnings (measured after tax), and acts as a quasi-floor on the value. The other is a subjective assessment made by buyers and sellers of stocks, of the discounted-present-value of a future stream of after-tax, corporate cash flows—usually in the form of dividends. Since the value of both components has been reduced by the corporate income tax, the tax on capital gains is no less a double tax on corporate income than is the tax on dividends. For the sake of simplicity, this analysis excludes consideration of the tax-deferral benefits inherent in the tax-treatment of capital gains (rather than taxing stock appreciation annually, capital gains are taxed when a stockholder elects to sell his or her stock). Again, for simplicity’s sake, neither does the analysis take into account the tax penalty stockholders may incur due to the erosive effects of inflation on capital appreciation.

As shown in Table 1, when the U.S. federal-and-state, corporate-level tax rate of 39.1 percent is combined with the 30.3 percent maximum-average rate on dividends or capital gains, the aggregate rate of tax on corporate income reaches 57.6 percent. This is second only to France at 64.4 percent and is 27 percent higher than the average rate for the other OECD countries. It is also 30 percent higher than the 44.3 percent maximum combined-federal-and-state marginal tax rate on earned income.

When the effective federal-and-state rate of 29 percent is combined with the 30.3 percent dividend and capital gains tax, the total rate comes to 50.5 percent. As for tax-deferred entities—which, as noted above, own about 35 percent of the total value of publicly-traded corporate stocks—the corporate-level tax (ranging between an average of 29 percent and a high of 39.1 percent) will be additive to an earned-income tax that will be levied when the tax-deferred income is distributed to beneficiaries during retirement. Currently the maximum marginal-income tax rate (the top federal rate and the average top state rate) is 44.3 percent; thus, the maximum, aggregate tax rate on retirement income will be between 60 and 66 percent. To the 46 percent of Americans who plan to use tax-deferred savings as a major source of retirement income, the mere existence of this hidden tax constitutes a broken promise. And the imposition of the tax at such a high rate seems inequitable in the extreme.

Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax?

The subject of who pays the corporate income tax has been studied and debated by economists since the tax was first conceived. The only issue on which there is complete agreement is that the entire corporate tax is borne by individuals.

On the surface it appears that the effect of the tax is borne solely by the investors in stocks. But as we learned in our make-believe dialogue, this is, in many cases, incorrect. People invest money where they can get an after-tax return that is commensurate with the risk they assume. If the corporate tax increases to a point where such returns are not adequate, the stockholder has all of the options described by our imaginary economist. While a consensus of economists agrees that a portion of the corporate-level tax is shifted from investors to workers or consumers, there is no clear consensus on how much is borne by each group. In large part, the apportioning of the tax is dependent upon shareholder composition and the economic circumstances in existence in the industry in which the company competes.

But regardless of how the corporate-level tax burden is apportioned among the groups, the consequences in each case are bad. Milton Hayek is right: To the extent the tax—the highest in the world—is borne by shareholders, the high rate works to discourage investment in U.S. corporations, resulting in an increase in the corporate cost of capital, and causing a reduction of U.S. competitiveness. This in turn suppresses growth in GDP, job creation, and standard of living. Moreover, in order to mitigate the negative impact of the high tax rate, U.S. corporations have been driven to relocate their operations or seek (legally sanctioned) tax havens in low-tax foreign countries. This has resulted in about $1.7 trillion in U.S. corporate cash (a full 60 percent of the cash held by multinationals) being sequestered offshore when it could be directly invested in the U.S. or distributed to shareholders (via dividends or stock buybacks), thus adding it to the U.S. savings and investment pool.

To the extent the tax is borne by workers (through a reduction in wages), it will be hidden from view and is largely proportionate (flat) rather than progressive. While many people would applaud a change from a progressive tax system to a flat tax system (I am one), this is an unintended consequence that is inconsistent with current tax law. To the extent the tax is borne by consumers, it will be regressive, and thus an unfair hardship on low-income taxpayers. Finally, to the extent the tax is borne by shareholders that are tax-deferred entities, it will be a hidden tax that, when combined with the tax on distributed income at retirement, is patently unfair.

Regardless of one’s political views of these outcomes, it would clearly be best if they were transparent, so those bearing the tax would know they are being taxed and in what amounts. Such transparency does not exist with respect to the corporate income tax.

Toward a More Rational Corporate Tax System

If the current system of taxing corporate income is neither economically efficient, nor fair to workers, consumers, and retirees, how should it be changed? Some economists would prefer to deal with the corporate tax within the context of a more comprehensive overhaul of the entire tax system. They would have us broaden the tax base through the elimination of deductions, credits, and exemptions, while simultaneously lowering marginal tax rates. Others would like to shift from a tax system based on income to one based on consumption. But eliminating the double taxation of corporate income is not mutually exclusive with such objectives and may be a more practical near-term goal.

The obvious way to reform the corporate income tax system is to remove one of the two taxes. (Later we will examine whether income from savings and investment should be taxed at all. If it should not, then both of the taxes should be eliminated.) This can be done at either the corporate or the individual level. Of the two choices, the elimination of the tax at the corporate level seems best, if for no other reason than it would eliminate the current indirect tax on workers and on pension funds and other tax-deferred entities.

An alternative approach to dealing with double taxation, and the one favored by many economists, is to integrate the corporate income tax with the individual income tax. Under this approach, the corporate entity would pay no tax. Instead, individuals would pay the tax on corporate income directly under one of two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, shareholders (excepting tax-deferred entities) would pay taxes each year on the amount of their allocable share of corporate income, just as do owners of pass-through entities. In this scenario, the distribution of income (via dividends) would not be a taxable event because the tax will have already been paid. The tax rate could either be determined under the tax system used for pass-through entities (currently a graduated scale that tops out at a combined, marginal federal and state rate of 43.4 percent), or perhaps at a lesser rate such as the rate currently levied on dividends and capital gains. In any event, the indirect tax on pension funds and other retirement accounts would be zero. One problem with this system is that shareholders would be required to dip into cash reserves or sell off company shares or other assets in order to pay the tax. Another problem is that, if the tax is levied progressively, it would discourage investment and entrepreneurship (unfortunately, this problem already exists with pass-through vehicles).

The second scenario in which shareholders would pay the tax would be simpler, more economically efficient, and arguably more equitable. In this scenario, as in current law, there would not be a taxable event to the shareholder until an actual cash transaction occurs, specifically when a dividend is received or a stock-sale transaction is executed (assuming the transaction resulted in a gain). In either case, the shareholder would pay a tax at the prevailing rate. Currently the top combined rate is 30.3 percent. Historically, a reduced rate for capital gains and dividends has been justified by lawmakers in large part to encourage investment, which is an essential driver of economic growth. In addition, the rate has been held down on the grounds that investment in for-profit businesses carries a higher risk than other types of investments (such as bonds and real estate), thus a reduced tax rate is required to attract investor capital. Again, under this scenario, pension funds and other tax-deferred entities would pay no tax.

The case for zero tax on corporate income

Regardless of which scenario is selected, the big question is: What is the appropriate rate at which to tax corporate income? Fortunately, picking a rate is not completely subjective since we have both empirically based research and logic to guide us.

Most tax theorists would agree that for a tax to be acceptable, it should be an optimal combination of economically efficient and equitable. The current corporate income tax system is neither.

Economic efficiency. In an article on income inequality in August/September 2012 issue of the Hoover Institute journal, Policy Review, Professor Lee Ohanian and I wrote that high tax rates on capital income (including corporate income):

…is at variance with the standard view in the public finance literature on the perils to economic efficiency of taxing capital income. Many studies find that in the long run capital-income tax rates should be set near zero, even if society chooses to redistribute income. Taxing capital is particularly harmful because it is supplied very elastically. This means that even small increases in taxes on capital income lead to a lower capital stock, which, relative to other forms of taxation, depresses labor productivity, wages, and living standards.

This statement applies to all capital income. But corporations are particularly vulnerable to high taxes because in this current era of globalization, capital moves freely across borders; and even a small increase in the cost of capital can have a disproportionately negative impact on the economy. And of course, a decrease in the cost of capital can have a disproportionately positive impact.

In a paper published in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), “Working Paper Series” dated December 2013, and entitled, “Simulating the Elimination of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax”, the four authors—three of whom are prominent economists (the fourth is a college economics student)—presented the output of a model they constructed that simulates the economic effects of eliminating the corporate income tax. These are some of their findings:

…when wage taxation is used as the substitute revenue source, eliminating the U.S. corporate income tax, holding other countries’ corporate tax rates fixed, engenders a rapid and sustained 23 to 37 percent higher capital stock…with most of the added investment reflecting capital inflows in response to the U.S.’ highly favorable corporate tax climate. Higher capital per worker means higher labor productivity and, thus, higher real wages. Indeed…real wages of unskilled workers end up 12 percent higher and those of skilled workers end up 13 percent higher.

These higher real wages raise the incentive to work. But they also deliver offsetting income effects that induce less, not more labor supply. The net impact is a modest decrease over time in the supply of labor. But, on balance, output rises—by 8 percent in the short term, 10 percent in the intermediate term, and 8 percent in the long term…

Whether we like it or not, we live in a global marketplace that is growing more competitive every day. With the highest corporate-level income tax in the developed world (and the second highest aggregate tax on corporate profits), our economic efficiency is seriously compromised. This has placed U.S. industry at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to other industrialized nations. Many studies, including the simulation model cited above, credibly assert that if we want to maximize economic growth and raise living standards, taxes on all forms of capital income (including corporate income) should be zero or near zero.

Equity. Notwithstanding the seemingly dispositive economic-efficiency argument for near-zero taxes on capital income, some contend that “income is income” regardless of its source, so taxing income from savings at a lower rate than income from labor is unfair to wage and salary earners. They say—in the interest of equity—such a policy should be eschewed regardless of its positive effect on growth and median income.

Others, however, argue that income from savings is quite different than income from labor and that any tax on capital income is inequitable.

A compelling case can be made that this latter argument is superior. In the Policy Review article cited above, Professor Ohanian and I wrote:

In addition to economic efficiency considerations, we believe that taxing any income from savings and investment is inequitable. Here’s why: Assume two people, Angelina and Brad, have exactly the same lifetime earned income, but Angelina saves 10 percent of her after-tax income and Brad saves nothing. In this hypothetical, if income from savings is taxed, Angelina will pay more lifetime tax than Brad, simply because she saved. We believe this is clearly inequitable.

The economic-efficiency rationale for not taxing income from savings is endorsed by a large body of economists and is supported by a multitude of empirical studies. The equity argument for eliminating the tax on capital income is less popularly known but seems equally credible and quite difficult to refute. To borrow from the Bible, “In the beginning”, all income is earned; that is, derived from labor of some kind—physical or mental. Income from capital is only possible if earned income has been saved and invested. And since the earned income has already been taxed it seems logical that if two persons have the same lifetime earned income, and one (the “saver”) makes the choice to forego current consumption in favor of saving for the future, and the other (the “consumer”) makes the choice to forego future income in favor of current consumption, the saver should not have to pay tax on that future income. Otherwise, the saver would effectively be double-taxed and thus forced to pay higher lifetime taxes than the consumer.

Conclusion

The U.S. corporate income tax system—double taxation, resulting in rates that are substantially higher than those of our industrial competitors—is economically inefficient. In addition, by penalizing people who forego consumption in favor of saving, the system is inequitable.

So, if taxing corporate income is both economically inefficient and inequitable….why do we have a corporate income tax?

April 4, 2014